The end of America's era of superiority in the Persian Gulf
Prominent Western analysts and strategists believe that the balance of power in the Persian Gulf is fundamentally changing. As Iran's deterrence capability increases, the confidence of Washington's regional allies decreases, and the American public grows weary of Middle Eastern interventions, many observers speak of the beginning of a process that could lead to the end of the United States' dominant role in the region.
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According to the Taghrib News Agency, something fundamental has changed in the Persian Gulf, and analysts who have made their careers watching the display of American power are now saying what was once unspeakable: the era of the United States' leading military base in the Middle East is effectively over. Whether Washington chooses confrontation or withdrawal, the strategic outcome appears to be the same: the slow and irreversible erosion of American influence in a region it has dominated since the 1970s.
This diagnosis crystallizes around the current stalemate with Iran. For scholars like John Mearsheimer, the prominent offensive realist from the University of Chicago, this crisis confirms a structural reality that American strategic culture has long refused to accept.
Mearsheimer has argued: "The United States is in the unfortunate position of being unable to roll back Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf without paying enormous costs." This judgment is a summary of what two decades of costly interventionism have created: a regional order that has decisively distanced itself from Washington, and a military situation that is increasingly difficult to maintain.
The numbers are alarming. The United States currently has nearly 40,000 troops across the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, concentrated at bases like Al Udeid in Qatar and the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. These facilities were designed for an obsolete strategic reality: one characterized by unchallenged US air superiority, Iran's nascent missile capabilities, and the unwavering deference of regional partners. None of these conditions remain today.
Iran's arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles now numbers in the thousands, and its precision strike capability has been demonstrated with deadly credibility—an issue that became particularly evident in the 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia's Aramco infrastructure; attacks that temporarily disrupted nearly five percent of the global oil supply.
US policymakers now face a deeply challenging dilemma. Military intervention aimed at targeting Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities would likely intensify rather than neutralize the Iranian threat.
Retired Admiral James Stavridis, former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces, has warned that "conflict with Iran would be extraordinarily difficult," adding that "the geography of the Persian Gulf creates enormous vulnerability for our surface assets and ground bases."
The missile and drone attacks that would follow any initial American strike could render the bases from which operations were launched unusable within days. The infrastructure that supports US power—from runways and fuel depots to command nodes—becomes a vulnerability the moment deterrence fails.
Conversely, choosing a structured withdrawal carries its own strategic penalties, imposed under the watchful eyes of concerned Gulf partners. Anwar Gargash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, has spoken of the "need for development and strategic independence" for the region—a phrase that was diplomatically unimaginable just a generation ago.
The government of Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi Crown Prince, has also actively engaged in parallel diplomacy with Beijing. This process culminated in the significant 2023 China-mediated agreement to restore relations with Tehran—a geopolitical shift that would have been unthinkable without American approval in the past.
The implicit message in these actions is undeniable: if Washington cannot guarantee security, the Persian Gulf states will seek support elsewhere.
Although American think tanks have lagged in internalizing these strategic dynamics, more precise assessments are emerging. For example, analysts at the RAND Corporation have proposed the concept of a "deterrence gap" in the Persian Gulf, viewing it as the discrepancy between the threats the US claims to deter and the capabilities it can actually deploy effectively in contested environments.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has also noted that "America's credibility in the region is based on a paradox": the more Washington threatens to use force, the more the limits of what force can truly achieve become apparent.
What distinguishes this moment is not the crisis itself, but its certainty. The logic had always been that America could lose a battle because it would never lose the region. Maintaining that confidence has now become more difficult.
The combination of Iran's anti-access capabilities, declining partner confidence, and a domestic American political culture weary of Middle Eastern conflicts has removed previously available options.
The fundamental issue is no longer the sustainability of the US military presence in the Persian Gulf—because evidence strongly refutes this assumption. Rather, the main question is whether Washington possesses the necessary strategic capacity to execute a deliberate and managed withdrawal before deteriorating conditions impose an unwanted and disorderly exit.
By: Jassem Al-Azawi
