The Middle East in Historical Transition; The Decline of American Hegemony and the Rise of a Multipolar Regional Order

Since the end of the Cold War, the international order appeared to have been solidified in favor of the United States. The Soviet Union collapsed, and Washington rose to the top of the world as the leading military, economic, and political power. In the Middle East, this hegemony was consolidated after the 1991 Gulf War and strengthened through an extensive network of military bases and security alliances, to the point where it became difficult to imagine a regional order not managed by the United States or in which it did not have the final word. However, history teaches us that hegemony is not a permanent state, and great powers do not suddenly collapse; rather, they gradually erode through attrition, the accumulation of mistakes, and the emergence of new rivals.

In this context, Jiang Xueqin, a Chinese analyst, presents a widely discussed perspective: that the Middle East is on the verge of a new era, that US hegemony has entered a phase of decline after the war with Iran, and that America will not be able to achieve a complete victory. This does not mean Iran's victory over the world's leading military power, but rather America's defeat in the war due to the erosion of its political will, enormous costs, attrition, heavy casualties, and the gradual loss of its international credibility.

This, in turn, will drive the global order toward complete transformation. Jiang does not present this as a political aspiration or a prediction, but rather as an analysis based on historical patterns that have been repeated in past empires. According to his logic, empires do not collapse due to a single defeat, but due to the accumulation of costly wars, internal divisions, and the declining ability to impose their will simultaneously on allies and enemies.

Jiang believes that the United States now faces a complex strategic dilemma. It needs to protect its allies, deter its enemies, and maintain its military presence, while at the same time avoiding being drawn into endless wars that drain its economy and political power.

This equation has become more difficult than two decades ago, especially with the emergence of China as an economic and military power, Russia's return to the arena of competition, and the willingness of many countries to diversify their partnerships rather than relying entirely on Washington. He sees the Middle East as the clearest testing ground for this transformation.

A region that for decades was an arena of almost absolute US influence is now witnessing rapid changes. China has entered forcefully through economics, investment, and diplomatic mediation. Beijing has even accused American companies of stealing Chinese technology, especially in the field of artificial intelligence, after the US had previously accused the Chinese of stealing Western technology. Russia has consolidated its military presence in several locations, while regional powers have become more independent in their decision-making. Countries no longer wait for Washington's approval as they once did. Instead, they act according to their own calculations, reflecting a decline in America's ability to monopolize regional decision-making.

Jiang argues that the great paradox is that any large-scale military escalation could accelerate America's decline rather than stabilize its influence. Every new war requires more costs, exacerbates internal divisions, and prompts other powers to exploit Washington's preoccupation to expand their influence in various parts of the world.

In this sense, the United States may find itself defending a regional order that it no longer has the resources to maintain in the way it did in past decades. However, this view is not a definitive conclusion, but one of several possible scenarios. Some argue that America still has the largest network of alliances in the world, the strongest nominal economy, and the largest military force, and that talk of the end of its hegemony is premature.

Therefore, the real value of Jiang's analysis is not in its precise prediction of the future, but in prompting us to reconsider the assumptions that have governed international politics for three decades. The Middle East we knew after 1991 is not necessarily the Middle East that will emerge in the next decade. The balance of power is shifting, alliances are reshaping, and great powers are readjusting their priorities in a world that has become more complex and more difficult for any single power to control.

Jiang may be wrong in some of his predictions, and perhaps only parts of them will prove correct, but it is difficult to ignore the fact that the world is currently in a historical transition. Therefore, the question is no longer whether the international order will change, but rather what form this change will take, and if American hegemony continues to decline, which powers can fill the void. At the heart of this turbulent landscape, the Middle East will remain the most sensitive and influential arena in shaping the contours of the future global order.