Talal Atrisi, University Professor and Director of the Lebanese Center for Strategic Studies:
"America has reached a strategic deadlock against Iran and has no choice but to accept defeat"
Washington, in dealing with Iran's nuclear file, has become trapped in a vortex of "strategic confusion." On one hand, it fears "diplomatic failure" and accepting Tehran's terms, and on the other hand, its inability to pursue the military option due to the reduction of the US Army's interceptor missile stockpile has destabilized its position. This is while Iran's political and military cohesion has not only not collapsed but has been strengthened.
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According to the Taghrib News Agency, Talal Atrisi, university professor and director of the Lebanese Center for Strategic Studies, in an interview with this news agency, elaborated on the dimensions of the Iran-US nuclear file and the existing tensions between the two sides, considering the latest developments and tensions. The text of this interview follows:
Do you believe that the American side is truly serious about ending the war with Iran? In your opinion, why did Trump agree to negotiate despite Iran's definitive demands and Tehran's refusal to back down from its red lines?
The US government faces strategic confusion and contradictory behavior regarding the Iran file. Washington is concerned that agreeing to a deal would be interpreted domestically and internationally as "surrendering to Tehran's terms." On the other hand, it cannot return to the military option, as there is no realistic guarantee to contain Iran or change its calculations. Meanwhile, reports of a reduction by half of the US Army's interceptor missile stockpile have further destabilized Washington's position. This gap between the "claim of a good deal," "buying time," and "military threats" reveals the indecisiveness within Trump's team.
The root of this turmoil lies in Washington's failure to achieve the war's major objectives. Contrary to official narratives, the nuclear program was merely a cover for the fundamental goals of "regime change" and "creating social collapse" in order to, from within this chaos, facilitate control over Iran's oil resources and completely neutralize its nuclear capabilities. But when the calculations of a "victory in five days" faced the barrier of Iran's resistance, Trump resorted to a scorched-earth strategy, targeting civilian infrastructure—from schools and hospitals to universities.
Now, after more than 40 days, Trump finds himself in the quagmire of a war of attrition in which Iran's political and military cohesion has not only not collapsed but has been rebuilt. In such a situation, Washington's inevitable acceptance of the negotiating table, especially with Tehran's terms as the focus, is a direct reflection of developments on the ground, because in the history of conflicts, the negotiating table has always been a complete mirror of battlefield realities.
Has the principle of "unity of fronts" among the countries of the axis of resistance, which accelerated during the years of war against Iran, become a strategic trump card for the success of the negotiations?
A noteworthy and unprecedented point in this confrontation is the operationalization of the "united fronts" principle by Iran. Previously, the concept of the "resistance front" was mainly discussed at a rhetorical level, and each front acted independently. However, during this round of conflicts, Iran has succeeded in creating unprecedented operational coordination by relying on this principle, which has now become one of the main pillars of the negotiation process. In fact, Trump's willingness to accept Iran's demands is not a political choice but the inevitable result of failure to achieve war goals and the shift in the balance of power on the ground.
The strategic and fundamental change in the current situation is Iran's explicit and direct adoption of the "united fronts" principle. By declaring that all these arenas are considered allies of the Islamic Republic, Tehran has demanded a halt to attacks on all these fronts—a proposition that has become a critical pressure point for the American negotiating team because it is directly tied to Israel's security and survival.
In this regard, Washington is caught in a strategic dilemma: on one hand, imposing a ceasefire on Israel might be interpreted by observers as a "defeat for Tel Aviv," and on the other hand, these very doubts and concerns have led the negotiations to a deadlock or delay. With this new equation, Iran has redefined itself as the central power of a regional bloc, unconditionally committed to preserving and strengthening its allied arms. This approach has changed the regional balance of power in such a way that the outcome of the war—contrary to initial expectations—has led to a reduction in US influence and the weakening of the position of its military bases in the region.
Do you agree with the narrative that "America's use of its military bases in the region to attack Iran occurred without consulting these countries or considering their positions"?
On a broader level, these developments have shaken the traditional foundations of diplomacy in the Persian Gulf states. For years, these governments believed that the presence of American bases provided an security umbrella for the survival of their regimes against the "Iranian threat," and they formulated their foreign policies hoping to form alliances such as an "Arab NATO" based on enmity towards Iran.
But the realities revealed in this war dealt a heavy blow to this belief. The use of defense systems stationed at these bases to defend Israel—not the host countries—proved that Washington's strategic priority is the protection of Israel, not the security of Arab countries. Consequently, Arab capitals are now wandering in a difficult position between "American pressure to participate in the war" and "fear of the security costs if American bases are targeted by Iran"—a situation that seems likely to lead to a redefinition of regional relations and an increasing shift towards a new model of interaction with Iran and its allies.
How do you describe the post-war phase in the region, especially Iran's relations with its neighbors and the Persian Gulf region?
What we are witnessing today on a broader regional level is a strategic shift in the approach of the Persian Gulf states—a shift manifested on two levels: first, maintaining active diplomatic channels with the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and second, attempting to prevent any return to a state of war. Arab capitals have realized well that if the fire of war is reignited, they will pay the highest price. This reality has forced regional governments to reconsider their security doctrines, because the recent experience showed that Washington's promises of support at critical junctures are ineffective. Consequently, moving towards signing non-aggression pacts and memoranda of security cooperation with Tehran is a likely prospect for future developments. This is the idea that Iran has always emphasized: "Regional security must be provided by the region's own actors, not extra-regional forces."
What message have the Iranian people, through their epic resistance and presence on the ground throughout the war and until today, conveyed to the world and the region?
On the other side of this field, the failure of Washington's and Tel Aviv's two main bets completely changed the equations. They thought that by assassinating the leadership pillars, Iranian society would collapse into chaos. But in practice, not only did this not happen, but external pressures became a factor for national cohesion and unprecedented unity among the Iranian people. The widespread and steadfast presence of the people in the streets, their decisive demand for accountability, and their unquestioning support for the government became a "trump card" in the hands of Iranian diplomats—something that Trump's team lacks, as he struggles with a lack of legitimacy and social support both within the US and internationally. This pattern of national resilience has now become a global message, showing that internal cohesion is the backbone of power in tough diplomatic fields.
In the hidden layers of this conflict, it is also important to examine why some regional countries initially cooperated with Washington. According to available information, this cooperation seems to have taken shape in a two-stage process. Initially, regional countries were influenced by "Israel's image-making"—a narrative that was fed to Washington and then sold by the United States to the Persian Gulf states: the promise of a "lightning war" that would, within days, lead to the overthrow of Iran's political structure and the elimination of the threat to its neighbors. In such an atmosphere, these countries agreed to the use of military bases on their soil for fighter jets to attack Iran—an agreement that, now that they see the realities on the ground and the failure of that scenario, has turned into a diplomatic and security nightmare for them.
The initial scenario for the attack on Iran was based on a "quick finish"—a notion that lost its color with the firing of the first missiles. When it became clear that Iran not only did not remain silent in the face of attacks on American bases in the region but directly targeted them and jeopardized the existence of these countries, the calculations of regional actors changed. America's significant silence in the face of these attacks, and its exclusive focus on the "defense of Israel," seems to have marked the beginning of the "second chapter" of regional countries' interaction with Washington.
This new phase is defined by "growing disgust" at being involved in America's conflicts and "refusal to allow the use of bases again" for operations against Iran. The regional countries, which have already paid the price for this forced cooperation, are now more than ever seeking "peaceful solutions" and "avoiding future wars," as the fear of paying heavier costs has erased any new military boldness from their minds.
This paradigm shift indicates the end of the era of "immunity" for American bases. If in the first stage these bases were active with the "implicit or explicit green light" of the host countries, in the second stage, America did not even bother to "obtain permission again." But now, this "heavy burden of America's presence," which was supposed to ensure regional security, has itself become a "serious threat" to the existence of regional countries, driving them towards "getting rid of this costly presence." This means that the "season of separation" from America seems to be the only option for these countries to truly ensure their security.
